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ARTISTIC PRACTICE-AS-RESEARCH: A GENEALOGICAL ACCOUNT

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Keywords

practice-as-research
practice-based PhD
genealogy
discourse
ethico-onto-epistemology

Abstract

In this chapter I address the processes of exclusion by which the discourse of practice-as-research is constituted and sustained. I ask: what is or is not practice; what is or is not practice-as-research; and why or why not choose to call practice research? By interrogating the boundaries of practice-as-research – within which I practice research – I probe the value systems through which entangled knowledges become differentiated.

Introduction

Answer me this: Why would artistic practice *not* be considered research? Further, why would practice-as-research *not* belong in a university? As an artist in academia, I share these questions with sceptics and advocates of practice-as-research alike to interrogate the implicit values that circulate as doubt about what practice-as-research is, where it belongs, and why and for whom it *might* matter.

A word of caution before we proceed: the request to explain how artistic practice relates to research is a trap. Describing the interaction of practice and research reinforces the assumption that these are independent processes to begin with, which come into contact in ways that can be observed, or even designed. In reflecting on unfamiliar and emergent research practices with the logic of familiar and dominant methodologies, divergent expressions of knowledge remain illegible – or even invisible – within established systems of interpretation and evaluation. What might be considered practice and research 'become' together, in context, and are ontologically and epistemologically bound.

Consider this: there is no research without practice, because the doing of research is itself a practice. In research practices, the motives and methods of the researchers are entangled with the knowledges produced. As Karen Barad emphasizes:

> We don't obtain knowledge by standing outside the world; we know because we are *of* the world. We are part of the world in its differential becoming. The separation of epistemology from ontology is a reverberation of a metaphysics that assumes an inherent difference between human and nonhuman, subject and object, mind and body, matter and discourse. Onto-epistem-ology – the study of practices of knowing in being – is probably a better way to think about the kind of understandings that we need to come to terms with how specific intra-actions matter.[2]

As researchers, we are part of research cultures in their differential becoming; this differentiation involves the continual exclusion of voices and knowledges as a means to sustain the boundaries within which contributions to knowledge become significant – or non-signifying. In the

political positioning of practice as a form of research in universities, advocates must account not only for what constitutes knowledge in practice-as-research, but also for what knowledges are excluded – intentionally or not – from this privileged frame. Such accountability entangles onto-epistem-ology with ethics:

> […] what we need is something like an ethico-onto-epistem-ology – an appreciation of the intertwining of ethics, knowing, and being – since each intra-action matters, since the possibilities for what the world may become call out in the pause that precedes each breath before a moment comes into being and the world is remade again, because the becoming of the world is a deeply ethical matter.[3]

In bringing awareness to the ethical weight of exclusion by which the boundaries of knowledge in a given practice of research – including practice-as-research – are continually enacted, the implicit value systems of its advocates and sceptics (myself included) may be examined.

In the subsequent sections I propose a genealogical account of the discourse of practice-as-research: firstly, I query what it means to have a practice, as the basis from which this practice may be deemed research; secondly, I entangle interpretations of practice and theory, from phenomenology to positivism; thirdly, I interrogate what is *not* considered research within the frame of practice-as-research, as well as how, why, and by whom qualifying practices-as-research are evaluated.

What is (not) practice?

Practices within and between disciplinary boundaries

In order to pursue practice-as-research, it follows that one must pursue a practice. Artistic practice. Somatic practice. Medical practice. Legal practice. Spiritual practice. At times, one may fall out of practice. If an individual stops practicing, or practices less, at what point does their activity no longer qualify as a practice? Does a surgeon who has not performed surgery in one, five, or even ten years still have a medical practice? Does a choreographer who has not created work for an extended period of time still have a choreographic practice? Conversely, if one

begins a new activity, like playing the piano or taking ballet lessons, at what point is this activity elevated to the status of being an artistic practice – this individual's practice as an artist? According to the Wikipedia entry for 'Practice (learning method)': "Practice is the act of rehearsing a behavior over and over, or engaging in an activity again and again, for the purpose of improving or mastering it, as in the phrase 'practice makes perfect'."[4] This suggests that establishing a practice requires repetition, duration, and mastery – but how much repetition, how much duration, and how much mastery – and according to whom?

According to Malcolm Gladwell: "the magic number for true expertise: ten thousand hours" – with the caveat that training must begin in childhood.[5] Other researchers argue however that factors such as "general" and "central" intelligence, "working memory capacity," and heredity must also be taken into account in paths to "success."[6] The quantitative measures of disciplinary expertise espoused by the 'practice makes perfect' camp versus its critics invokes a sticky debate between the role of biological determinism versus cultural constructivism in the 'road to success.'

In what ways, however, are the above narratives of success undermined when practices are understood as *disciplinary*, i.e. self-regulatory systems wherein cause and effect between objectives, behaviours, and outcomes are not predetermined or distinguishable? Michel Foucault describes the disciplinary effects of power as:

> […] a total structure of actions brought to bear upon possible actions; it incites, it induces, it seduces, it makes easier or more difficult; in the extreme, it constrains or forbids absolutely; it is nevertheless always a way of acting upon an acting subject or acting subjects by virtue of their acting or being capable of action. A set of actions upon other actions.[7]

Any judgment of what constitutes either having or falling out of a given disciplinary practice is highly subjective and situated, owing to the disciplinary effects of power operating within and as attitudes-towards-attitudes over time. In the arts, qualifications for practitioners are largely self and peer-defined, with measures that vary within academic and professional circles, as well as geographically. In scientific traditions such

as surgery, psychiatry, or pharmacy, attempts to standardize qualifications are important for public safety, yet still vary across regions and over time.

The implicit and explicit assessment procedures of various practices work to define and maintain the local membership of a practice, i.e. which practitioners can claim to *have* this practice, as well as the external borders of a practice, i.e. how this practice is different than other practices. The mutual constitution of the boundaries within and between practices means that these boundaries are always already in shifting relation, with the threat of disruption and transgression from one another.

The Practice/Theory Trap

Supposing that a person indeed has a practice, attempts to qualify this practice in relation to theory reinforce the assumption that practice and theory emerge as separate processes. Oxford Dictionaries provides multiple definitions of practice as it relates to theory, stating firstly that practice is: "the actual application or use of an idea, belief, or method, as opposed to theories relating to it."[8] Simply put: through practice, we apply theory – not produce it. The separation of theory and practice in this explanation has deep roots in Cartesian metaphysics with its hierarchic split of mind over body, immaterial over material, and abstract over concrete. In *Meditations on First Philosophy* (1641), philosopher René Descartes urges scepticism regarding subjective, sensory perceptions derived in human experience, and proposes that through the mind and soul one can attempt to overcome the deceitful nature of mortal matter in search of certainty, truth, and ultimately God.[9]

> I will suppose then, that everything I see is spurious. I will believe that my memory tells me lies, and that none of the things that it reports ever happened. I have no senses. Body, shape, extension, movement and place are chimeras. So what remains true? Perhaps just the one fact that nothing is certain.[10]

The doubt regarding experiential knowledge seeded by Descartes is consequential with regards to embodied practices – which all practices are – as *meaningful* modes of research. Whether in somatic or medical practice, physics or philosophy, if phenomenal processes such as vision, memory, body, and movement cannot be trusted, what then is the

relationship of these processes, if any, to constructions of knowledge? In his 'Objections and Replies' to the *Meditations,* Descartes elaborates:

> Although there is deception or falsity, it is not to be found in the senses; for the senses are quite passive and report only appearances, which must appear in the way they do owing to their causes. The error or falsity is in the judgement of the mind […]. Nevertheless, when deception occurs, we must not deny that it exists; the only difficulty is whether it occurs all the time, thus making it impossible for us ever to be sure of the truth of anything which we perceive by the senses.[11]

The uncertainty expressed by Descartes must be understood contextually in the era during which he lived, i.e. before the rise of Cartesian dualism, certainty, and objectivity, and before Edmund Husserl's phenomenology.[12] Susan R. Bordo proposes that Descartes' practice of first-person intentionality in the *Meditations* "may be understood, loosely, as a 'phenomenology' of Cartesian skepticism,"[13] taking note of "how unresolute a mode of inquiry they embody: the dizzying vacillations, the constant requestioning of the self, the determination, if only temporary, to stay *within* confusion and contradiction, to favor interior movement rather than clarity and resolve."[14] And yet, the "model of knowledge that Descartes bequeathed to modern science […] is based on clarity, certainty, and detachment."[15] Reframing the *Meditations* as a "'phenomenology' of Cartesian scepticism" brings into question oppositional accounts of Cartesianism versus Phenomenology, as well as the ways in which these ideologies have become associated with practices of objectivity in the *hard* sciences versus subjectivity in the *soft* research of the arts and humanities. Doubtful as it may be, this binary between objective and subjective research is reinforced time and again by adherents of both sides in a reactionary battle to validate the continued membership and support of their chosen disciplinary practice.

Entangled practice: Positivism and Phenomenology

Discussing the radical orientation of both Descartes and Husserl towards ontological uncertainty, Paul S. MacDonald suggests that:

> Both Descartes and Husserl envision an overall response to the sceptical challenge as a demand to renovate the principles under which claims to 'scientific' knowledge are made at all. For each thinker this involves demolishing a false picture or model of what a scientific theory of the world would seem to require a mind to be: for Descartes the mind was another 'object,' but of a unique kind; for Husserl, the mind could never be another kind of object encountered in the world. Their radicalization of pregiven structures of scientific knowledge disclosed an entirely new world […] not simply a new way of looking at an old problem, or new terms for expressing an accepted distinction, but rather an entirely new philosophical discourse in which that problem or that distinction can be articulated.[16]

Only through these emergent contexts, i.e. 'new worlds,' could Descartes' and Husserl's discursive conceptions of bodies and minds become salient. Short of deconstructive methods, if and when practices and theories stretch beyond the boundaries of existent discourse, they may remain incomprehensible – or even invisible – as contributions to knowledge within pre-existing cultures of research. As Foucault describes:

> This *a priori* is what, in a given period, delimits in the totality of experience a field of knowledge, defines the mode of being of the objects that appear in that field, provides man's everyday perceptions with theoretical powers, and defines the conditions in which he can sustain a discourse about things that is recognized to be true.[17]

While contemporary texts may frame practices of research in "'modernity,' 'the scientific paradigm,' 'the Cartesian model,' [and 'phenomenology'] as discrete, contained, historical entities about which coherent 'closing' narratives can be told,"[18] investigating the effects of such movements across cultures and disciplines over time points to their entanglement, and potential destabilization, within situated conceptions of knowledge. These situated discourses – as practices – must be interrogated not only for the knowledge they produce, but also for the ways in which they constrain the production and distributed activity of other forms of knowledge. In emergent and hybrid processes of discourse – which may involve reading,

writing, discussing, moving, making, or even stillness and silence – it is critical to remember that "[discourse] is not what is said; it is that which constrains and enables what can be said. Discursive practices define what counts as meaningful statements,"[19] and likewise, what constitutes a meaningful contribution to knowledge within a given frame of reference.

In deconstructing the operation of disciplinary power throughout the history of medical, psychiatric, penal, and religious discourse, Foucault argues "contrary to the phenomenologists," that constitutions of knowledge cannot be accounted for solely "by historicising the subject," i.e. positioning the researcher as the producer and transmitter of situated knowledge. Rather, the deconstruction of disciplinary power requires a process of:

> […] genealogy, that is, a form of history which can account for the constitution of knowledges, discourses, domains of objects, etc., without having to make reference to a subject which is either transcendental in relation to the field of events or runs in its empty sameness throughout the course of history.[20]

Taking, for example, Foucault's genealogy of medical discourse, he notes a transformation starting at the end of the eighteenth century and spanning twenty-five to fifty years, during which the field:

> […] broke not only with the 'true' propositions which it had hitherto been possible to formulate but also, more profoundly, with the ways of speaking and seeing, the whole ensemble of practices which served as supports for medical knowledge. These are not simply new discoveries, there is a whole new regime in discourse and forms of knowledge.[21]

In Foucault's account of knowledge, practices and theories are inextricably entangled through the disciplinary effects of power that regulate the boundaries of disciplinary discourse from within. The disciplining of "ways of speaking and seeing" is not a matter of determinism and prohibition, but rather involves continual processes of discursive constraint, through which particular practices contribute to the salient knowledge of a discipline – thus gaining the status of being a practice, or even, a practice that is research.

What is (not) practice-as-research?

The discourse of PaR

Since the 1960s in the UK and internationally, practitioner-researchers have advocated for the value of alternative methods of knowledge production in an academic context.

> Sometimes called the 'practice turn' the trend was widespread across many disciplines – from philosophy through science and technology to cultural studies – and characterised by post-binary commitment to activity (rather than structure), process (rather than fixity), action (rather than representation), collectiveness (rather than individualism), reflexivity (rather than self-consciousness), and more.[22]

The discourse of PaR is not exclusive to the arts: "Indeed, practice is precisely the thing that artists have in common with other forms of scholarship and research."[23] Across academic disciplines, what differentiates practices that are research, from those that are not?

In an attempt to reconcile artistic PaR with academic research Robin Nelson outlines three categories of research: personal, professional, and academic, and argues that while all of these types of research "involve investigation, finding things out and drawing conclusions":

> […] only academic research requires that you must *establish new knowledge* or, to use the slightly softer phrase, afford *substantial new insights* (again the emphases are used to indicate the importance of these phrases). These criteria apply in all disciplines and, while it is possible to challenge established doxa – and indeed many challenges from practitioner-researchers have seen adjustments within the academy – these fundamental tenets of academic research as they have emerged in the modern scientific tradition since the Enlightenment would be hard to shift, even were it desirable to do so.[24]

While few artists associate their research explicitly with scientific discourse, traces of the scientific method endure in curricular and assessment frameworks for PaR in academia. The perseverance of scientific discourse

in PaR is evident in seemingly innocuous imperatives for practice-based researchers to identify research questions, objectives, methods, and contributions to knowledge. In the same vein, the recent 'Florence Principles on the Doctorate in the Arts' published by the *European League of the Institutes of the Arts* (ELIA), specifies that PaR doctorates must "[comply] with the prerequisites for a PhD, as formulated in the sciences and humanities."[25] The report states further:

> […] that all which holds true for doctoral research and the establishment of doctoral studies […] is also valid for doctoral studies in the arts. As different as research results might appear to be, the processes, epistemological drive and consistency with which research projects in the arts are undertaken remain the same.[26]

Similarly, the 'White Paper' published by the *Académies de Musique et Musikhochschulen* insists that: "Artistic Research should aspire to the same procedural standards that apply across the whole research spectrum – replicability (especially of procedures), verifiability, justification of claims by reference to evidence" – although they subsequently soften this claim of comparative rigour by pointing "to the individual and subjective nature of artistic practice."[27]

As *disciplined* artists, what is it that we hope to gain by insisting that artistic practice is, or can be, research? Conversely, what do academic communities hope to gain by convincing artists to pursue and present their activities in the frame of PaR?

Foucault muses at the motives – as well as the consequences – when researchers (in his example Marxists, but this is equally relevant to artists), attempt to equate their practice with scientific methodology and discourse:

> What types of knowledge do you want to disqualify in the very instant of your demand: 'Is it a science?' Which speaking, discoursing subjects – which subjects of experience and knowledge do you then want to 'diminish' when you say: 'I who conduct this discourse am conducting a Scientific discourse, and I am a scientist'? Which theoretical-political *avant garde* do you want to enthrone in order to isolate it from all the discontinuous

> forms of knowledge that circulate about it? When I see you straining to establish the scientificity of Marxism I do not really think that you are demonstrating once and for all that Marxism has a rational structure and that therefore its propositions are the outcome of verifiable procedures; for me you are doing something altogether different, you are investing Marxist discourses and those who uphold them with the effects of a power which the West since Medieval times has attributed to science and has reserved for those engaged in scientific discourse.[28]

Through the continual transposition of value systems from the sciences to the humanities to the arts within curriculum and assessment frameworks, PaR advocates invest the discourse of PaR – and also themselves as upholders of PaR – "with the effects of a power which the West since Medieval times has attributed to science and has reserved for those engaged in scientific discourse."[29] Invested with this discursive power, advocates of PaR enforce the boundaries of PaR by differentiating practice itself, from practice that is research.

Evaluating PaR

In recent years there has been much debate regarding how to demonstrate and evaluate rigour in PaR. Such debate, raised at symposia and on blogs, relates to institutional imperatives for knowledge production, such as those set forth by the Research Excellence Framework (REF) in the United Kingdom.[30] On a blog titled 'The Future of Practice Research,' Ben Johnson outlines three key pressures faced by practice researchers: 1. "the pressure to demonstrate value for money;" 2. "the pressure to align practice-based research with institutional strategies;" and 3. "the pressure to identify and engage with a wider research 'standard' or 'definition' that comes from practising in a university context."[31] On this same blog, a post by Victor Merriman responds to the question: "how can we best demonstrate excellence in practice research," stating: "The short answer is that the international academic standard for excellence – rigorous peer review – should be applied, and subject associations should be approached to test levels of interest in piloting practice research peer review networks."[32] This sentiment is furthered in the European University Association's 'Salzburg II Recommendations' with regards to peer review

as integral to the "[assessment] of the academic quality of doctoral education" with "[sensitivity] to disciplinary differences."[33]

In 2015, the *Journal of Studies in Theatre and Performance* announced a new section titled 'Curating Practice-as-Research,' the goal of which is to "evidence the methodological rigour and the research imperative of PaR projects that, ultimately, should strive towards the production of new knowledge."[34] In the call for contributions, Rachel Hann and Victor Ladron de Guevara state that suitable projects, submitted in the form of a "curated portfolio," will be peer reviewed based on their ability to identify clear research questions and aims, and contextualize the work in relation to previous scholarship and artistic practice.[35] Regarding curated portfolios, Hann emphasizes in a blog post that:

> The narrative of the research project is paramount. Yet, it is also to be concise and to the point – we are not, necessarily, interested in two hour long videos […]. It is vitally important that these documents offer a clear organisational principle and allow individuals to move in and out of particular sections. Ideally, a reader should be able to skip content in a logical manner, as well as pick up from when they left off. The experience should not be too far removed from the manner in which we are able to navigate a book. Nevertheless, the focus must remain on evidencing the knowledge claims. Additional information relating to a full documentation of a performance, for instance, is supplementary.[36]

The insistence in this description of PaR portfolios on adhering to traditional organizational principles, as well as a conventional time scale for reviewing, is an example of transposing the value system of one research culture onto another. This transposition of values is not only a prohibitive act, but rather, involves the continual differentiation of the boundaries within which certain articulations of knowledge become elevated "in order to isolate [them] from all the discontinuous forms of knowledge that circulate about [them]."[37] In PaR frameworks in which artist-researchers are encouraged, often by other artist-researchers, to evidence knowledge claims in a "logical manner" that is similar to the "manner in which we are able to navigate a book," the exclusion of alternative modes of articulation acts to sustain the boundaries within which practice-as-research *is*

research. Positioning the documentation of events as well as performances themselves as supplementary to textual discourse "constrains and enables what can be said" and further, "[defines] what counts as meaningful statements"[38] – linguistically or otherwise – in a given conception of PaR.

My interest here is not to determine the validity of one conception of research over another, but rather, to interrogate the value systems involved in the constitution and regulation of artistic PaR in different contexts. In a certain regard, positioning artistic practice as a form of research has potential to challenge institutional and cultural notions of 'what gets valued as knowledge' and therefore, to expand the scope of which endeavors receive life-sustaining resources.[39] In another regard, the concept of PaR can be understood as a regulatory device employed within communities of practice in order to standardize practices of research within and across disciplinary cultures, in service of establishing 'common ground' and 'shared knowledge.'

PaR as/and Research

When choosing to associate artistic practice with the concept of research, one may wish to consider that:

> Research is one of the ways in which the underlying code of imperialism and colonialism is both regulated and realized. It is regulated through the formal rules of individual scholarly disciplines and scientific paradigms, and the institutions that support them (including the state). It is realized in the myriad of representations and ideological constructions of the Other in scholarly and 'popular' works, and in the principles which help to select and recontextualize those constructions in such things as the media, official histories, and school curricula.[40]

To this end, the concept of practice-as-research, when differentiated only cosmetically from research itself, can act as a strategy to recruit outlying practitioners into the frame of dominant and centrist discourse, such that these new 'allies' – including many artists – willingly reinforce, rather than destabilize, the status quo of what counts as knowledge.

This is not to conclude, however, that artistic practice should not be associated with research, or that artistic practice does not benefit from

being positioned in academia. From an idealistic standpoint, the encounter of quantitative and qualitative research methodologies with critical and counter-methodologies, such as feminist, indigenous, and artistic practices-as-research, has potential to destabilize the boundaries of cultures of research. In turn, this destabilization may lead to unfamiliar ethico-onto-epistemological entanglements – in other words, 'new worlds,' in which other(ed) knowledges becomes visible.

Addressing different ways of knowing in PaR, especially in cases of cross and interdisciplinary collaboration, requires deconstructive methodologies and pedagogies that dismantle not only hegemonic power, but also the distributed and regulatory effects of power that sustain conceptions of knowledge within and across the boundaries of communities of practice. As Sandy Grande argues: "unless educational reform also happens concurrently with an analysis of colonialism, it is bound to suffocate from the tentacles of imperialism."[41] In a genealogical analysis of colonialism in research, the dismantling of assumptions regarding ontology, epistemology, and ethics in methodologies also calls into question the values that uphold assessment frameworks for research 'outcomes' as 'original contributions to knowledge.' Transposing the criteria for rigour and excellence from one disciplinary culture to another fails to account for knowledges that are excluded from, and invisible within, the frame of reference of a given assessment framework. Simon Jones argues that:

> […] the epistemological difficulties inherent in the phrasing of a judgment of practice-as-research are analogous to those encountered by physicists in their attempts to measure the quantum world using the experimental machinery developed to demonstrate Classical or Newtonian mechanics. The aporia between these realities – the everyday and the quantum – challenged the belief that systems could be finally known through measurement.[42]

Encounters between disciplinary cultures, from the sciences to the humanities to the arts, require deconstructive analysis of ways in which the value systems of the respective communities have become differentiated, but not disentangled, over the course of centuries. Resisting the transposition of disciplinary norms across practices is not a matter of

critique, at least not exclusively; rather, it involves continual processes of mutual destabilization of disciplinary boundaries, in order to shift the frames of reference within which different knowledges come to matter differently for different people.

In *Science and the Modern World* (1926) Alfred North Whitehead cautions that direct critique of entrenched values systems is ineffectual:

> When you are criticizing the philosophy of an epoch, do not chiefly direct your attention to those intellectual positions which its exponents feel it necessary explicitly to defend. There will be some fundamental assumptions which adherents of all the variant systems within the epoch unconsciously presuppose. Such assumptions appear so obvious that people do not know what they are assuming because no other way of putting things has ever occurred to them. With these assumptions a certain limited number of types of philosophical systems are possible, and this group of systems constitutes the philosophy of the epoch.[43]

In Whitehead's call for subversive tactics that address change over the course of an epoch and beyond, we are reminded that even what Nelson describes as the "fundamental tenets of academic research"[44] – its assumptions – are subject to transformation over time. While glacial shifts of value systems may not be perceptible within our situated frame of reference, and are certainly not under our individual control, the distributed effects of power across epochs means that we are always already implicated in the continual stabilization and destabilization of personal-professional-political boundaries. Through our mutual differentiation as subjects, our individual frame of reference is co-constituted with and within these boundaries – not to the point of stable determination – but as a dynamic lens that is itself invisible to us.

Attending to the ethical weight of exclusion by which the boundaries of knowledge in a given practice of research – including practice-as-research – are continually enacted, illuminates the invisible values of its advocates and sceptics alike, as well as its visible value within ethico-onto-epistemological entanglements.

Conclusion

As artists in academia, we have a lot to lose by questioning and deconstructing the machinery of PaR – for example our own jobs, funding, and resources – and so, we spend a lot of time defending it. After reading an earlier draft of this chapter, one of the volume editors commented:

> I do think it's important to figure out how to place you and your research here. You are, of course, not at arms length from these shared frames of reference. Your work at C-DaRE (for example) is funded by such frames (as is my salary). I really like that you are biting the hand that feeds you […].[45]

As an artist in academia currently pursuing my third practice-based degree in dance (BFA, MFA, PhD), I appreciate the privilege that framing my choreographic practice as a form of research affords me in terms of interdisciplinary collaboration and mentorship, as well as time and money. I benefit from advocacy for artistic practice-as-research, and indeed participate in it. My goal is not to attack or undermine the discourse of PaR. Conversely, I want to understand the seeds of doubt that I perceive within and beyond PaR communities, and within my own work, regarding what PaR both enables and constrains in the construction of entangled knowledges.

In the introduction I asked: "Why would artistic practice *not* be considered research? Further, why would practice-as-research *not* belong in a university?" These questions were not an end in themselves, but rather a means to enter into a genealogical account of "the constitution of knowledges, discourses, domains of objects, etc.,"[46] which continually differentiate conceptions of knowledge in PaR from other "forms of knowledge that circulate about it."[47] Within and across generations, cultures, and disciplines, the differentially constituted boundaries of practice versus research as well as practice-as-research, constrain and enable what may come to signify as an original contribution to knowledge in this domain – not once and for all – but continuously, through the distributed effects of disciplinary power within ethico-onto-epistemological entanglements.

Notes

[1] The discourse about PaR that I develop here is informed by and part of my long-term collaboration with composer John MacCallum.

[2] Barad*, Meeting the Universe Halfway,* 186.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Wikipedia, “Practice (learning method).”

[5] Gladwell, *Outliers*, 39-40.

[6] Macnamara et al., “Deliberate Practice and Performance,” 1. scholarship.rice.edu/bitstream/handle/1911/76260/Oswald_Deliberate_Practice.pdf.

[7] Foucault, “The Subject and Power,” 789.

[8] Oxford Dictionaries. “Practice.”

[9] Descartes, *Meditations on First Philosophy*.

[10] Ibid., 16.

[11] Ibid., 63.

[12] Bordo, *The Flight to Objectivity*, 34.

[13] Ibid.

[14] Ibid., 14, orig. italics.

[15] Ibid.

[16] MacDonald, *Descartes and Husserl*, 8.

[17] Foucault, *The Order of Things*, 158, orig. italics.

[18] Bordo, *The Flight to Objectivity*, 2.

[19] Barad, “Posthumanist Performativity,” 800-801. www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/345321.

[20] Foucault, *Power/Knowledge*, 117.

[21] Ibid., 112.

[22] Kershaw et al., “Practice-as-research,” 63-64.

[23] Ellis, “Giving Up On Practice-as-research,” 4.

[24] Nelson, *Practice-as-research in the Arts*, 25, orig. italics.

[25] European League, “Florence Principles,” 3.

[26] Ibid., 2.

[27] Académies de Musiques, “Key Concepts for AEC Members,” 3.

[28] Foucault, *Power/Knowledge*, 85, orig. italics.

[29] Ibid.

[30] Eastwood, “Future framework for research assessment and funding.”

[31] Johnson, *Rising to the Challenge*.

[32] Merriman, *Reflection on Breakout Session 1*.

[33] European University Association, “Salzburg II Recommendations,” 6.

[34] Hann and Ladron de Guevara, *Curating Practice-as-Research*.

[35] Ibid.

[36] Hann, *Practice Matters*.

[37] Foucault, *Power/Knowledge*, 85.

[38] Barad, “Posthumanist Performativity,” 800-801. www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/345321.

[39] Riley and Hunter, “Introduction,” xv.

[40] Smith, *Decolonizing Methodologies*, 8.

[41] Grande, “Red Pedagogy: The Un-Methodology,” 236.

[42] Jones, “The Courage of Complementarity,” 30.

[43] Whitehead, *Science and the Modern World,* 17*,* qtd*.* in Gillett*, “*Reduction and Emergence in Science and Philosophy,” 1.

[44] Nelson, *Practice-as-research in the Arts*, 25.

[45] Personal communication with Simon Ellis, 2017.

[46] Foucault, *Power/Knowledge*, 117.

[47] Ibid., 85.

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Biography

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